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Abstract
The first section analyses the European commitment to a welfare state in the light of the
creation of an Internal Market and the economic crisis. The second section addresses how the
EU has set about the reform and modernisation of public finances in response to the economic
crisis. The third part analyses how the EU is balancing a modernisation agenda of reforming
public services with a tougher agenda on reforming public finances. This section is followed by a
specific case study of the modernisation of the procurement and financing of public services.
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INTRODUCTION
The response to the economic recession in Europe has elicited
different reactions from, and within, the Member States as well as the
people affected by the economic downturn. As the election in
February 2015 of the new government in Greece, campaigning on an
anti-austerity election platform, has dramatically demonstrated, the
response of the European Union (“EU” or the “Union”) to the
economic crisis is by no means accepted as either a popular, or the
“right,” response.1
This Essay uses as its starting point the electioneering position
taken by right-wing political parties, exemplified in the statement
from Mitt Romney. For him the economic crisis in the EU has been
* Littleton Chambers, Temple, London.
1. On January, 25 2015 the left-wing party, SYRIZA, won a legislative election in
Greece but without an overall majority. It formed an “anti-austerity” coalition with the
Independent Greeks party on the following day and subsequently has been re-negotiating the
terms of the Troika (EU, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) bailout of its sovereign debt.
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created by the continuing commitment to public intervention in
markets and financing the national welfare state. Thus the responses
by the EU are inadequate to address the necessary structural reforms
to allow for economic growth: “Europe isn't working in Europe. It's
not going to work here. I believe in America. I believe in the
opportunity and the freedom that is American opportunity and
freedom. I believe in free enterprise and capitalism.”2
The theme is echoed in the electioneering by the Conservative
Party in the United Kingdom.3 To rebut the allegation requires a
qualitative analysis.4 This can be demonstrated in the adaptation of
the institutional and governance structures of the EU and the way the
EU has reacted to the economic crisis through fiscal and economic
reform measures,5 the use of [temporary] state aid,6 an attempt at
revitalising the single market,7 alongside the modernisation of

2. Mitt Romney, Remarks at the Republican Presidential Debate, (Sept. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/republicans/8783948/Mitt-RomneyEuropean-socialist-policies-not-right-for-US.html.
3. See Mark Briggs, ‘Europe Isn’t Working’ Says Cameron, EURACTIV.COM, (Mar. 17,
2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/uk-europe/europe-isnt-working-sayscameron-312965.
4. A quantitative response can be seen in evaluating various economic indicators in the
EU set out in Eurostat Reports. The Europe 2020 Strategy, adopted by the European Council
in 2010, seeks to establish a smart, sustainable, and inclusive economy in Europe with high
levels of employment, productivity, and social cohesion. National targets of Member States
reflect the five ambitious objectives of the strategy which cover employment, research &
development (“R&D”), climate change & energy, education and poverty reduction, reflecting
their situation, to be reached by 2020. EUROSTAT, the statistical office of the EU, has
provided a comprehensive overview with breakdowns by Member State of the progress the EU
has made toward its 2020 targets in the publication Smarter, Greener, More Inclusive?. See
EUROSTAT, Smarter, Greener, More Inclusive? Indicators to Support the Europe 2020
Strategy, (2015) available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/6655013/KSEZ-14-001-EN-N.pdf/a5452f6e-8190-4f30-8996-41b1306f7367.
5. See infra notes 37-75 and accompanying text.
6. See Christian Ahlborn & Daniel Piccinin, The Great Recession and Other Mishaps:
the Commission’s Policy of Restructuring Aid in a Time of Crisis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON EUROPEAN STATE AID LAW, 124 (Erika Szyszczak ed., 2011); see also State Aid
Scoreboard 2014, Aid In the Context of the Financial and Economic Crisis, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html.
7. Initiated through the Monti Report and implemented through the Single Market Act I
and II and the Europe 2020 Programme. See Mario Monti, A New Strategy For The Single
Market: At The Service of Europe’s Economy and Society (2010) [hereinafter The Monti
Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_
10_05_2010_en.pdf; Europe 2020, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/
europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/eu-tools-for-growth-and-jobs/index_en.htm.
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procurement,8 as well as modernising aspects of other aspect of state
intervention in markets, particularly public services (welfare and
social services) termed “Services of General (Economic) Interest” in
EU law and policy.9
The reaction to the economic crisis has adopted a distinctive EU
approach, and, indeed, was part of a reform and modernisation
process that started before the economic crisis was felt in Europe. The
EU response has been implemented as a mixture of political and
legislative change, the use of new governance processes and
governance tools. Often such responses are derived from the catalyst
of litigation at the national level, using the creative legal space of EU
law to challenge the law and policies of the Member States. This, in
turn, has allowed for a distinctive shift in political power in the EU:
between the Member States inter-se and between the Member States
and the Institutions of the EU. In tandem it has diminished the
populist trust in the EU by reversing the attempts of recent years for
greater accountability and democratic input in EU law and policymaking. One aspect of this movement embraced greater involvement
of national and local government in policy-making through the use of
subsidiarity. In turn this has allowed the EU to adopt a new hybrid
form of governance, based upon hard law and new processes of soft
governance leading to a plurality and diversity of instruments and
techniques which, to date, have escaped an adequate typology. This
evolution may be viewed as a permanent reform of the EU,
emphasising the flexibility of the EU to adapt its governance modes
as part of its own ecology, based upon political survival.10

8. See The Monti Report, supra note 7, at 76; Council Directive 2014/24/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Public Procurement and Repealing Directive
2004/18/EC, 2014 O.J. L 94/65; Council Directive 2014/25/EU 2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Procurement by Entities Operating in the Water, Energy,
Transport and Postal Services Sectors and Repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, O.J. L 94/253; see
also Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Award of
Concession Contracts, 2014 O.J. L 94/1.
9. See generally FINANCING SERVICES OF GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST: REFORM
AND MODERNISATION (Erika Szyszczak & Johan Willem van de Gronden eds., 2013). For a
typology of Services of General Interest, see Ulla Neergaard, Services of General Economic
Interest: The Nature of the Beast, in THE CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICES OF
GENERAL INTEREST IN EUROPE (Markus Krajewski et al. eds., 2009).
10. Erika Szyszczak, Social Policy: A Happy Ending or a Reworking of the Fairy Tale?,
in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds.,
1994).
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One important issue that has generated academic and political
discussion is whether the responses to the economic crisis have
dismantled or re-invented the role of state intervention in the
economy in Europe and the commitment to a welfare state. By taking
two areas on EU policy, the reform of macro-policy budgetary
surveillance and enforcement and the reform and modernisation of
public services in the EU, the unfolding analysis will argue that the
EU has not adhered to a strong commitment to maintaining a state
interventionist approach to the market or a firm commitment to
maintaining the status quo of a welfare state in Europe. But equally,
the crisis has reinforced the need for the role of state intervention to
be re-assessed and re-calibrated. There is a mixed and uneven
commitment to the continued scope for national social and welfare
systems to operate in an internal market. This has allowed for a new
political and constitutional configuration in the EU where concepts of
a national welfare state have been overtaken by fiscal and economic
modernisation of economic governance structures and a process of
modernisation. Thus, the position taken by Mitt Romney is
challenged by a mixed academic discourse within Europe. On the one
hand, there is a school of thought which suggests that rather than an
adherence to a strong interventionist model of the state in Europe,
there is a pervasive attachment to neo-liberalism.11 On the other hand,
a different school of thought argues that the recent responses to the
economic recession have served to weaken democratic involvement in
policy-making as well as the commitment towards developing socioeconomic rights.12 However, by analysing recent modernisation and
reform developments in the EU a more nuanced approach emerges.
The structure of the Essay is as follows. The first section
analyses the European commitment to a welfare state in the light of
the creation of an Internal Market and the economic crisis. The
second section addresses how the EU has set about the reform and
modernisation of public finances in response to the economic crisis.
The third part analyses how the EU is balancing a modernisation
11. See, e.g., RESILIENT LIBERALISM IN EUROPE’S POLITICAL ECONOMY (Vivien A.
Schmidt & Mark Thatcher eds., 2013).
12. See Paul O’Connell, Let Them Eat Cake: Socio-Economic Rights in an Age of
Austerity, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE, (Nolan, O’Connell & Harvey eds., 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915221; Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic
Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV. 532 (2011) (the discussion by the same author of a tendency not to
acknowledge judicial protection of socio-economic rights in the judicial fora by some national
Supreme Courts).
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agenda of reforming public services with a tougher agenda on
reforming public finances. This section is followed by a specific case
study of the modernisation of the procurement and financing of public
services.
I. THE WELFARE STATE IN THE INTERNAL MARKET
A particular argument that is put forward to argue that the
national welfare state is still strong in the EU is that the EU lacks
competence to create its own supra-national welfare state or
redistributive policies.13 This legal fact may act as a buffer towards
too much political or judicial interaction with national welfare
policies. Over time, opportunist litigation has used the forum of the
European Courts14 to challenge the legitimacy of national welfare
rules, against the free movement and competition rules of the TFEU
(the economic or market rules of the Treaty). But, if the European
Courts prioritised the economic law of the EU over national welfare
rules significant regulatory gaps would form where the EU cannot
fulfill a re-regulatory role. This is because traditionally, the
legislative, economic, and social spheres of the EU have been
separated, with the Member States retaining significant legislative
competence in the social and welfare sphere.15 Article 151 TFEU16

13. For several years, academic research used the typology of welfare states developed
by Esping-Andersen in GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM (1990). This approach has been challenged from a theoretical perspective,
alongside the challenges from the economic crisis and the recalibration of the welfare state in
EU Member States. See Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are
Typologies an Ideal or Realistic Strategy? (Draft Paper presented at Eur. Soc. Pol’y Analysis
Network Conf., Sept. 6-8, 2012), available at http://www.cas.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0005/89033/Ebbinghaus_-_Stream_2.pdf.
14. The General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”).
15. See Erika Szyszczak, Be Careful What You Wish For in FESTSKRIFT - LIBER
AMICARUM ET AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF RUTH NIELSEN (Jens Fejø, Ulla Neergaard,
Christina Tvarnø & Grith Skovgaard Ølykke eds., 2013).
16. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 151, 2012 O.J. C 326/114 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 151 of the TFEU states:
The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such
as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961
and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers,
shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and
working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the
improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting
high employment and the combating of exclusion.
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recognises a limited set of social objectives for the Union, but
legislative competence and the political will is not always available to
allow for Union social initiatives or interventions in areas governed
by national welfare law.17
Historically, the CJEU has been accused of prioritising
economic concerns of European integration over social values but,
from an early stage, has also paid lip service to demands that the
Union should not be a purely economic union but should recognise
social values.18 A general lack of legislative competence for the EU to
intervene in social and welfare policies, alongside the principle of
subsidiarity,19 has allowed the Member States to develop their own
culturally distinct social and welfare policies and to continue with
redistributive policies in tune with national preferences and mediated
through national democratic processes. This would be seen as
preferable to a diluted Union-level legislative compromise.
However, the autonomy of the Member States to determine and
mediate their welfare policies has been challenged in recent years
To this end the Union and the Member States shall implement measures which
take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of
contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Union
economy.
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of
the internal market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also
from the procedures provided for in the Treaties and from the approximation of
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action.
17. Two examples would be the tortuous legislative history of the Services Directive,
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the
Internal Market, 2006 O.J. L 376/36 (where numerous exclusions and safe harbours were
created for social services), and the Patients’ Rights Directive, Directive 2011/24/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Application of Patients’ Rights in CrossBorder Healthcare, 2011 O.J. L 88/46. See also Erika Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, in
SOCIAL SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST IN THE EU (Ulla Neergaard et al. eds., 2013).
18. See Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43/75 [1976] E.C.R. 455; Laval un Partneri Ltd. v.
Sweden, Case C-341/05 [2007] E.C.R. I-11767; International Transp. Workers’ Fed’n &
Finnish Seaman’s Union v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05 [2007] E.C.R. I-10799. See also
Renaud Thillaye, Gearing EU Governance Towards Future Growth: The Side-lining of
Europe 2020 and its Worrying Consequences (Pol’y Network Paper, 2013); Frank
Vandenroucke, Europe: The Social Challenge: Defining the Union’s Social Objective is a
Necessity Rather than a Luxury (Observatoire Social Européen Opinion Paper No. 11, 2012).
19. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), 2010 O.J. C
83/01 [hereinafter TEU Post-Lisbon]; see also TEU Post-Lisbon Protocol (No. 2) on the
Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality, 2007 O.J. C 83/206. The
Union’s social objectives include employment promotion, the development of human
resources with a view to lasting high employment, improved living and working conditions,
the dialogue between management and labour, proper social protection, combating poverty and
social exclusion.
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through a process of competence creep whereby opportunist litigation
has used the forum of the European Courts to challenge national
welfare rules, arguing for the prioritisation of economic law over
national welfare law. If such prioritisation occurs a national welfare
system can become destabilised. Litigation becomes contagious:
litigation from one Member State may stimulate interest in litigation
in other Member States, creating the potential for national welfare law
to fall like a house of cards.20 So far, this has not happened in Europe.
The European Courts have been sensitive to national democratic
preferences and have created principles to protect national welfare
systems from the full force of EU economic law by deploying various
techniques. For example European Courts have found that certain
activities are not “economic” activities and therefore not caught by
the Treaty rules;21 or that a welfare system displays sufficient
solidarity to either justify the non-application of the Treaty rules or to
invoke a justification or exemption from the Treaty;22 or by the use of
20. Perhaps the most developed area of challenge to the organisation of national welfare
schemes is seen in the litigation relating to patients’ rights to move to receive health care in
another Member State. By asking the home state to pay for health care received in another
Member State could seriously upset the financial balance of a national care system, as well as
impact upon the supply of medical care in the home—and the host—Member State. See
HEALTH CARE AND EU LAW (Johan van de Gronden ed., 2011); see also Stephane De La
Rosa, The Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare or the Art of Codifying Complex Case Law,
49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 15 (2012).
21. Examples from the European Court’s case law include the exercise of public
authority involving strategic services. See, e.g., Corinne Bodson v. SA Pompes funèbres des
régions libérées, Case 30/87, [1988] E.C.R. 2479 (mooring services in ports) Corsica Ferries
France v. Direction Général des Douanes, Case C-49/89, [1989] E.C.R. 4441 (air traffic
control) SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-43; Selex
Sistemi Integrati SpA. v Comm'n, Case C-481/07P, [2009] E.C.R. I-2207 (anti-pollution
surveillance); Diego Calì & Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), 34
Case C-343/95, [1996] E.C.R. I-1547. See also Okeoghene Odudu, Economic Activity as a
Limit to Community Law, in THE OUTER LIMITS OF EU LAW 225-43 (Catherine Barnard &
Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2009).
22. See e.g., Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, Case C-355/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5263;
Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v. Instituto nazionale per l'assicurazione contro gli
infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Case C-218/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-717; Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v.
Maschinenbau und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, Case C-350/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-1513;
Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, Case C-355/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5263; Sodemare SA &
Others v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-70/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3395; Albany International BV
v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751; Case C-155-157/97,
Brentjens Case C-67/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-6025; Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v.
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven, Case C-219/97, [1999] E.C.R.
I-6121;Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz, Case C-475/99, [2001].C.R. I8089; Comm'n. v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., Case C-160/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-03713; Diego Calì &
Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), Case C-343/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-
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the derogation in Article 106(2) TFEU that the application of the
market rules of the Treaty would prevent a Service of General
Economic Interest from fulfilling its obligations effectively;23 or by
allowing for Member States to justify national welfare policies
through overriding reasons in the public interest.24
Alongside the European Courts’ sensitivity to national welfare
systems a door has been opened for the Commission to develop soft
governance processes to “persuade” the Member States to modernise
social welfare policies. This has been described as a process of
Europeanisation as EU sites and fora emerge and processes
stimulated to create a dialogue and a discourse at the EU level to
persuade the Member States—and public opinion—to modernise and
liberalise welfare and public services. This began with the evolution
of open methods of co-ordination for social issues25 and was
reinforced by the Commission deploying soft law. Such processes
involve different constellations of stakeholders to drive the agenda of
modernisation of social and public services in Europe.26

1547; AGR2 Prévoyance v. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, Case C-437/09, [2011] ECR I-1003.
See also Ulla Neergaard, In Search of the Role of “Solidarity” in Primary Law and the Case
Law of the ECJ, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL:
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 97-138 (Ulla Neergaard & Ruth
Nielsen eds., 2010); Malcolm Ross, The Value of Solidarity in European Public Services Law,
in THE CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST 81-99 (Markus
Krajewski & Ulla Neergard, eds., 2009); Tamara Hervey, “Social Solidarity”: A Buttress
Against Internal Market Law?, in SOCIAL LAW AND POLICY IN AN EVOLVING EU 31-47 (Jo
Shaw ed., 2000); Michael Dougan, Expanding the Frontiers of EU Citizenship by Dismantling
the Territorial Boundaries of the National Welfare States?, in THE OUTER LIMITS OF EU LAW
119, 199-265 (Catherine Barnard & Okeoghene Odude eds., 2009); Rob Houtepen & Ruud Ter
Meulen, New Types of Solidarity in the European Welfare State, 8 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS
329, 329-40 (2000); Jonathan White, Rethinking Transnational Solidarity in the EU,
PERSPECTIVES: CENTRAL EUR. REV. INTL. AFFS. 40, 40-57 (2003); NATHALIE KARAGIANNIS,
EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY (2007).
23. Case C-320/91, Corbeau, [1993] E.C.R. I-2563.
24. Seen especially in the free movement area and healthcare litigation. See Vassilis
Hatzopoulos, Financing National Health Care in a Transnational Environment: The Impact of
the EC Internal Market, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 761, 761-804 (2009); J.M.F. Martin & Síofra
O’Leary, Judicial Exceptions to the Free Provision of Services, in SERVICES AND FREE
MOVEMENT IN EU LAW, 163-95 (Mads Andenas & Wulf-Henning Roth eds., 2002).
25. See generally Peter Lelie & Bart Vanhercke, Inside the Social OMC’s Learning
Tools: How “Benchmarking Social Europe” Really Worked 19 (OSE Paper Series Research
Paper No.10, 2013).
26. See Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17, at 317. For a new attempt
at analysis of when and how soft law is used in the EU, see Fabien Terpan, Soft Law in the
European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law, 21 EUR. L.J. 68.
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II. THE MODERNISATION OF PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE EU
A significant incursion into national welfare policies has
occurred as a result of the EU response to the sovereign debt crisis.
The crisis turned attention to the weaknesses and instability of the
economic and monetary constitutional structure of the Union,
particularly the weaknesses in monitoring imbalances in public
budgets. The explanations for these weaknesses are multiple and
involve political and governance aspects of the EU integration model.
Realising the euro became a political end in itself, with a blind eye
turned to the creative accounting used by some Member States to
meet the original convergence criteria targets. But another weakness
is that the EU is not a complete economic and monetary union
(“EMU”), with several Member States refusing to contemplate
membership,27 and several new Member States hastily adjusting their
economic and fiscal policies to join the EMU as a badge of honour.
As a consequence, Article 121 TFEU states that “Member States shall
regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern.” This
exposed the choices made by the Member States in balancing their
public finances to scrutiny and was implemented through the use of
multilateral surveillance techniques with a weak form of peer review
and weak sanctions in the form of Recommendations.28 As a result,
several Member States became exposed and vulnerable as the
economic recession deepened and now have been subjected to macroeconomic reform and modernisation programmes in order to receive
bailouts from the EU. These programmes have impacted the financing
and delivery of welfare services in the Member States as they have
been asked to “effectively renegotiate their basic social contracts.”29
The response of the EU to the existing inadequacy of macroeconomic surveillance in the EMU was to introduce a new procedure
of surveillance and enforcement called the “excessive imbalance
procedure.”30 While these new procedures continued with the peer
pressure approach of earlier techniques, a new remedy, or sanction,
was introduced whereby a Member State belonging to the euro area
27. For example, the United Kingdom and Denmark.
28. See generally Dariusz Adamski, National Power Games and Structural Failures in
the European Macroeconomic Governance, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 1319, 1319-64
(2013).
29. J-W. Müller, Beyond Militant Democracy?, 73 NEW LEFT REV. 44 (2012).
30. Council Regulation 1176/2011, art. 22, 2011 O.J. L 306/25; see also Council
Regulation 1174/2011, 2011 O.J. L 306/8.
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that does not follow a Council Recommendation is subject to a fine of
0.1% of its GDP. This is not an automatic process. The Commission
must issue a Recommendation finding the Member State concerned is
affected by excessive imbalances.31 In practice, even this stage of the
new processes is not automatic. Several Member States experiencing
excessive budget imbalances and under macroeconomic reform
programmes imposed as part of the conditions for obtaining financial
assistance from the “Troika” (the IMF, the ECB, and the EU) as part
of the financial rescue programme, notably, Greece, Ireland and
Portugal, were not subject to further in-depth investigation by the
Commission. 32
Article 136(3) of the TFEU provides that the “granting of any
required financial assistance . . . will be made subject to strict
conditionality.” The depth of the economic recession and the
exposure of a number of weak economies led to stricter emphasis
upon the reform of welfare budgets alongside the need to modernise
employment policies without overlooking the need for a socialeconomic balance in the prescriptions handed out.33 The explanation
for the imperative—and harshness—of the requirements to reform
domestic economic policies is explained by Adamski as part of the
solidarity of the EU: “This democratic dynamic explains why the
more Germany and other creditor countries financially assist the euro
area countries on the downside, the more they are susceptible to
alleviate the harshness of the conditionality of assistance and the more
ground the idea of a fiscal union gains.”34
Furthermore, as an explanation for the weaknesses, or lacunae,
in the supra-national powers of the Union, Adamski notes, “[b]ut it
also instantiates a fundamental paradox of the Union’s political
constitution. Institutions of the Union do not have enough legitimacy
31. See Council Regulation 1176/2011, supra note 30, art. 7(1).
32. An explanation for the reticence to fine a Member State may be that a
Recommendation is a non-binding instrument in EU law. See Jonathon Zeitlin, Socializing the
European Semester? Economic Governance and Social Policy Coordination in Europe 2020,
(Watson Inst. Int’t Stud., Brown U. Working Paper No. 17, 2014). Observing that in a public
lecture, Judge Koen Lennaerts raised doubts as to whether sanctions under the Excessive
Imbalances procedure of the MIP were legal, but this point was not made in the written version
of the lecture. See Judge Koen Lennaerts, Address on Economic Integration, Solidarity and
Legitimacy: The EU In Times of Crisis, available at https://www.kuleuven.be/euroforum/
viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=DOCS&ID=860.
33. See S. Bekker et al., EU Governance of Economic and Social Policies: Chances and
Challenges for Social Europe, 2 EUR. J. SOC. L. 103-20 (2013).
34. Adamski, supra note 28, at 60.
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to pursue structural reforms at the national level, while only
structurally reformed Member States would not be a burden to a fiscal
federation.”35
The Commission recognised the absurdity of fining a Member
State with an economy already under financial stress. More surprising
is the fact that the Commission also chose not to find that the Member
States of Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Slovenia, and France, which were also
experiencing excessive imbalances, were “only” “very serious”
imbalances in the case of Spain and Cyprus and “serious” imbalances
in the case of France, Italy, and Slovenia. However, the lack of
sanctions for non-compliance, alongside the deepening of the
sovereign debt crises in some Member States, forced the political
hand of the EU to introduce a new political and constitutional
approach to economic governance. On March 2, 2012 twenty-five
Member States signed a new Treaty: The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
(TSCG).36 This Treaty created the Fiscal Compact which requires the
signatory Member States to enact into national constitutions (or
fundamental law) a commitment to converge progressively towards a
structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP (0.1% for States with a debt ratio
substantially below 60%), with compliance monitored by independent
institutions. A different layer of enforcement is introduced in that a
Member State may/should take legal action under Article 8(1) TSCG
against a Member State not implementing a balanced budget. If the
action is successful the CJEU should impose a fine, by way of a lump
sum or penalty payment, that shall not exceed 0.1% of the GDP of the
Member State in breach of the Treaty rules (Art. 8(2) TSCG).
The involvement of the CJEU in the enforcement of the
solidarity pact of the Member States moves beyond a reinforcement
of the rule of law as an integral part of the EU integration model. It
also reinforces the moves away from participative democracy in the
decision-making framework of the EU. A deeper and more profound
impact of the new constitutional structure is also noted by Damien
Chalmers in The European Redistributive State and a European Law
of Struggle. He argues that the effect of the Court’s new role has been
to alter the constitutional balance in the EU to allow for the
emergence of what he describes as a new form of redistributive
35. Id.
36. The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic abstained from signing the new Treaty
on Accession to the EU; in 2013 Croatia signed the new Treaty.
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state.37 This new polity is described as a regulatory state where fields
of domestic economic and fiscal policy-making have been transferred
to “new areas of political contestation” in which other Member States
and the EU Institutions are more heavily involved in domestic policymaking. Chalmers perceives that this new form of polity lacks the
conventional constraints associated with constitutional democracies
and the rule of law, arguing that the traditional public law heritage of
the Union, a system of accountability, democratic engagement, and
constitutional checks and balances, has been lost to the emergence of
a regulatory state.
The radical nature—and permanence—of the alterations to the
institutional balance in the Union are also analysed by Mark Dawson
and de Witte.38 Their analysis is detailed in scope by arguing that the
constitutional structure of the Union contains a ‘substantive’,
‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimension that has been affected, or
recalibrated, by the response to the economic and fiscal crisis in
Europe.
According to their thesis the substantive balance of the Union is
destabilised by the manner in which citizens of the Union have lost
ownership and authorship over core values that have culturally and
historically shaped national values towards a welfare state.
Both theses may be expanded by drawing upon the use of the
economic, or market rules, of the Union being used by opportunist
litigation to challenge core values of national law. The lack of Union
legislative competence has not restrained the European Courts from
acknowledging that social and welfare policies which are economic in
nature may be mediated through EU law, primarily through the scope
of justifications and derogations from the Treaty rules. This limits the
autonomy of the Member States, particularly through the necessity to
re-appraise national rules to comply with the principle of
proportionality.
Dawson and de Witte argue that the institutional balance of the
Union is altered by decreasing the voice of marginalised interests and
representative institutions.39 The loss of representative influence is
37. See, e.g., DAMIAN CHALMERS, THE EUROPEAN REDISTRIBUTIVE STATE AND A
EUROPEAN LAW OF STRUGGLE, 18 EURO. L.J. 667 (2012).
38. See generally Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU
After the Eurocrisis, 76 MOD. L. REV. 817 (2013).
39. See K. Lenaerts & A. Verhoeven, Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for
Democracy in EU Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET
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seen in the development of new constellations of actors in policyformation fora, chosen and orchestrated by the Commission through
soft governance processes40 and in the dominance of the executive,
and now the CJEU, in the new fiscal surveillance and enforcement
mechanisms of EMU. Thus the result is likely to be greater power for
national executives, with responsibilities for the initiation of, and
compliance with, policy proposals shifting during the economic crisis
towards the European Council (that is, the executives of the Member
States). This is a significant departure from the attempt towards
encouraging a greater involvement in national parliaments in EU lawmaking scrutiny and the move towards local decision-making through
the principle of subsidiarity.41
Finally, according to Dawson and de Witte, the marginalisation
of certain interests is also seen in terms of the threat to the spatial
balance of the Union, which protects the voice of smaller and poorer
Member States and their citizens from majoritarian or even
hegemonic tendencies. The increased influence of the bigger, more
resourceful Member States, in combination with the changes to the
Union’s substantive and institutional structure, leads to the loss of
political autonomy for smaller and poorer Member States.
The frustration of this denial of democratic participation in
decisions affecting national interests has spilled out onto the streets of
European cities from Lisbon to Dublin, and from Madrid to Athens.
III. THE RECALIBRATION OF THE SOCIAL AND THE
ECONOMIC
The Treaty of Lisbon 2007, negotiated before the economic
crisis, is portrayed as a significant turning point in the constitutional
structure of the Union, signaling a qualitative change to policy
making: a recalibration or rebalancing of the economic priorities
found in the earlier Treaties with a set of social aims and values set
out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”). 42
In particular the use of the term “a highly competitive social market
(C. Joerges and R. Dehousse eds., 2002); see also J. P. Jacque, The Principle of Institutional
Balance, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 387 (2002).
40. See Szyszczak, supra note 17.
41. See Adam Cygan, Accountability, Parliamentarism and Transparency, in THE EU:
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS (2013).
42. See Erika Szyszczak, Building A Socioeconomic Constitution: A Fantastic Object?,
35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1364 (2012).
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economy” in Article 3 TEU suggested the EU would intervene to
create social policies alongside respecting the Member States’
commitments to social welfare policies. This would go some way to
plugging the regulatory gaps when national law clashed with the
fundamental economic law of the EU, as well as to ensure that a
social dimension was part of the response to the economic crisis. But
the ability of the EU to deliver on this promise has been questioned.43
And, as this analysis reveals, the social dimension of European
integration has been subsumed into the new macroeconomic
surveillance mechanisms and economic imperatives of reform and
modernisation. Zeitlin and Vanhercke describe the process as
“socializing of the European Semester.”44 By this they argue that
social policies have been absorbed into the economic co-ordination
framework, the European Semester, through the increased focus
social objectives as targets in EU Recommendations to the Member
States, an increased emphasis on social monitoring and multilateral
surveillance and peer review of Country reporting, an enhanced role
for social and employment actors, for example, the EU Employment
and Social Protection Committee. At the same time the Commission
refused to engage in the Social Open Method of Coordination,
arguing that the policy processes should be coordinated within the
Europe 2020 process and that social reporting should be channeled
through the European Semester.45 Zeitlin and Vanhercke argue that
these developments are “a product of reflexive learning and creative
adaptation by social and employment policy actors to the new
43. Fritz W. Scharpf, The Asymmetry of European Integration, or: Why the EU Cannot
be a ‘Social Market Economy’, 8 SOCIOECONOMIC REV. 211 (2009); see Dragana
Damjanovic, The EU Market Rules As Social Market Rules: Why the EU Can be a Social
Market Economy, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1685 (2013).
44. See Zeitlin, supra note 32. The European Semester begins in November when the
Commission issues its Annual Growth Survey identifying key economic challenges faced by
the EU and identifies priorities for action. The Survey reviews the Country Specific
Recommendations from the previous year. Simultaneously the Commission issues an Alert
Mechanism Report which identifies the Member States deemed necessary for In-Depth
Reviews under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (which reports in March). Using the
Annual Growth Survey the European Council in March endorses the EU and national priorities
and provides reflections on the implementation of the previous cycle of reporting. In April the
member States submit their Reform programmes which cover the Europe 2020 Guidelines and
the Euro+Pact commitments, as well as the Macro Imbalances Procedure and their Stability or
Convergence programmes. The Commission assesses these programmes in May, proposing
Country-Specific Recommendations which are reviewed by the ECOFIN and EPSCO
Committees and endorsed by the European Council in June/July.
45. See id. at 29.
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institutional conditions of the European Semester: another form of
‘socialization.’”46
For some commentators this is a missed opportunity to
recalibrate and modernise the European welfare state.47 However,
there are some countervailing pulls towards balancing the economic
and social values of the EU. For example, a reinforcement of the
social dimension to EU political integration can be seen in the
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU basic
law, alongside greater reference to the Charter in European Court
judgments. Contained in Articles 34-36 of the Charter is a Chapter on
“Solidarity”, and recognising as part of the EU heritage are a set of
welfare rights and principles common to the Member States: social
security, social services, social housing, healthcare, and public
services (services of general economic interest).48
Additionally, a constitutionally entrenched boundary between
economic and non-economic activities was created in Article 14
TFEU where a distinction is made between public services, known as
Services of General Economic Interest (“SGEI”) and non-economic
services of general interest (“NESGI”). This distinction is reinforced
in Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest (“SGI”), setting a
means of dividing competences between the EU and the Member
States.
Thus the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 facilitated a bridge between
national welfare state policies and the complementarity of a set of EU
social welfare policies. The near absence of an EU social dimension
in the earlier Treaties had allowed the Member States leeway in
developing national policies on public services and protecting these
policies from outside competition. But now, this notion of a “bounded
space” for national welfare policies has been increasingly challenged
by opportunist litigation testing the national welfare policies against
EU market or economic law.49

46. Id. at 4.
47. See ANTON HEMERIJCK, CHANGING WELFARE STATES (2013); see also Anton
Hemerick, Lecture at the London School of Economics, Fault Lines and Silver Linings in the
European Social Models (June 14, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/
publicEvents/events/2014/06/20140611t1830vNT.aspx).
48. For a detailed commentary on the meaning and scope of the Charter, see THE EU
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff
Kenner, Angela Ward eds., 2014).
49. The term is used in MAURIZIO FERRERA, THE BOUNDARIES OF WELFARE (2005).
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At EU level, initially, the emphasis upon the social dimension to
European integration was boosted in a way that would challenge the
integrity and structure of national welfare policies, particularly in the
financing and demographic planning of the delivery of such services.
The CJEU provided intellectual leadership towards creating the idea
of a single market in welfare services by allowing individuals to
access public services in another Member State by utilising the
concept of Citizenship of the Union,50 replacing the traditional
territorial boundaries with a new single market for public services.51
However, there is a lack of symmetry in this process.52 In shaping the
supply side of public services it has proved not to be as easy for EU
law to open up cross-border markets, outside of the liberalisation of
the networked industries.53 If we take one sector, healthcare services,
the CJEU has shown that there can be incentives for competition to
materialise in public social services, for example, by allowing patients
seeking alternative health care in another Member State to utilise the
free movement provisions of EU economic law.54 Despite the push for
patients’ rights and free movement, health care supply side reform is
largely underdeveloped at the EU level. The creation of markets in
cross-border health care is the exception with the majority of social
public services continuing to be provided within territorial
boundaries. At first sight the Member States have been allowed to
create a safe, protected laboratory to experiment with different forms
of liberalisation, or marketisation, modernisation, and reform of such
50. But see Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13, [2014]
E.C.R. I____ (delivered 2014). The CJEU placed limits on Citizenship where a migrant was
unable to claim special non-contributory social security benefits when she was not legally
resident in a Member State. See Jobcenter Berlin Neuköln v. Nazifa, Sonita, Valentina &
Valentino Alimanovic, Case C-67/14, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (delivered 2015).
51. Access to some public services has proved easier than others. See, e.g., R v. London
Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills, ex parte Dany Bidar, Case
C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119 (discussing education). In contrast access to public social
security benefits has been tightened. Compare Dano Case C-333/13, with
Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v. Brey, Case C-140/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Sept.
19, 2013); Gryzelczck, C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-06193; Förster C-158/07 (delivered Nov.
18, 2008).
52. See Erika Szyszczak, Legal Tools in the Liberalisation of Welfare Markets, in
INTEGRATING WELFARE FUNCTIONS INTO EU LAW—FROM ROME TO LISBON (Ruth Nielsen
et al. eds., 2009).
53. See Sodemare SA & Others v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-70/95, [1997] E.C.R. I3395.
54. See generally HEALTH CARE AND EU LAW, supra note 20; De La Rosa, supra note
20.
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services within their own territorial and cultural space.55 This has
been achieved through the lack of litigation to challenge certain
sectors as well as the use of exemptions and safe havens of certain
sensitive social services such as social housing, hospital care, or
education created in EU secondary law and European Commission
soft law Communications.56 However, the economic and fiscal crisis
has created a countervailing pull to the evolution of a national-led
social dimension to the EU by focusing the re-shaping and
recalibration of public services as economic services, guided by
considerations of competition and efficiency.
The drive for the marketisation of social services is taking place
not only through demands made by the response to the fiscal and
economic crisis but also the marketisation processes inevitably have
led to the application of free movement and competition law to areas
of state activity previously shielded from the economic law of the EU.
The need, on the one hand, to shield public services from
competition, but, on the other hand, to ensure a level playing field
where significant amounts of public expenditure, as well as access to
ancillary markets is concerned, has blurred the boundaries of EU law.
This is generating strong pressure on some of the solutions adopted
by the CJEU when trying to protect the Member States freedom from
the checks and balances derived from EU economic law.57 To address
this emerging problem the European Commission has created a new
form of governance through soft law communications to retain a
normative dimension to EU regulation of social and welfare
services.58
The first attempts at modernisation of national social services
and social security systems were initiated through soft forms of
55. Albert Sanchez Graells & Erika Szyszczak, Modernising Social Services in the
Single Market: Putting the Market into the Social, in FOSTERING GROWTH: REINFORCING THE
INTERNAL MARKET CEU EDICIONES 61-88 (J. Maíllo & J. Beneyto eds., 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326157.
56. See Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17. But note, however, such
sectors may not be totally immune from the fundamental Treaty rules on competition and free
movement. See Libert v. Gouvernement flamand, Joined Cases 197/11 & 203/11, [2013]
E.C.R. I___ (delivered May 8, 2013). Here a Flemish law on social housing was tested against
the free movement rules. See also Diputación Foral de Bizkaia, Case T-397/12, [2015] E.C.R.
I___ (delivered May 19, 2015).
57. See e.g., Fenin v. Commission, Case C-205/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. I-6295; AOK
Bundesverband, Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK) v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft
Cordes, Joined Cases C-264/01 & 306/01 & 354/01 & 355/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-2493.
58. Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17.
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persuasion to the Member States, through the use of
Recommendations and discussions termed “High Level” talks
between civil servants of the Member States. Reform of public
services was on the modernisation agenda of the EU before the
sovereign debt crisis added to the economic and fiscal crisis in
Europe. In 2008 a renewed Social Policy Agenda was adopted by the
Commission.59 This was intended to complete the limping Lisbon
Process for the years 2008-2010 by linking employment and
economic stability. Its aims were lost in the ensuing economic
recession and a lack of analysis and understanding as to how social
policy governance fitted with the new architecture for economic and
fiscal coordination outlined in the earlier section of this Essay.
Instead, following on from The Monti Report, the “Europe
2020” programme was adopted by the European Council in June
2010. This resulted in the Single Market Acts I and II which provide a
framework for modernisation of aspects of the Single Market. Of
significance alongside the modernisation and reform of the Single
Market is the integration of the social dimension of EU policy
coordination into the European Semester. In a Communication of
2013 social indicators continue to be the predominant policy tool,
alongside the coordination of national employment policy, in
monitoring the Member States’ social policies.60 Similarly social
indicators continue to be used to guide a social “open method of
coordination” to combat poverty, pensions and long-term care in the
Member States. The Communication suggests that the new procedure,
the “Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure,” may create a
surveillance mechanism to pick up imbalances that could threaten the
EMU macroeconomic policy surveillance mechanisms. Another new
mechanism termed the “Alert Mechanism Report” uses the indicators
of social policy to create a Score Board to alert the Commission to
conduct
further
in-depth
investigations
and
to
issue
Recommendations
accompanying
the
Country
Specific
Recommendations emerging from the European Semester reviews.
This is a new dimension to the way in which social policies, that
59. Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Renewed Social
Agenda: Opportunities, Access and Solidarity in 21st Century Europe COM (2008) 412 Final
(September 2008).
60. Communication on Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and
Monetary Union, COM (2013) 690 Final, 2014 O.J. C 67/24.
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affect the operation of welfare states in Europe, are brought within
macro-economic surveillance mechanisms. The subtle introduction of
this new area of surveillance is necessary because the legal base for
the six-pack and two-pack regulations is Article 121(6) TFEU that
states that “[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting by
means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance
procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4.”
Paragraphs Three and Four State:
3. In order to ensure closer coordination of economic
policies and sustained convergence of the economic
performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on the
basis of reports submitted by the Commission, monitor economic
developments in each of the Member States and in the Union as
well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad
guidelines referred to in paragraph 2, and regularly carry out an
overall assessment.
For the purpose of this multilateral surveillance, Member
States shall forward information to the Commission about
important measures taken by them in the field of their economic
policy and such other information as they deem necessary.
4. Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in
paragraph 3, that the economic policies of a Member State are
not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph
2 or that they risk jeopardising the proper functioning of
economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a
warning to the Member State concerned. The Council, on a
recommendation from the Commission, may address the
necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned. The
Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, decide to
make its recommendations public.

IV. REFORM OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE EU
The economic crisis created new challenges for the Member
States to continue to supply and adapt public services under the
traditional national material and financial structures. Member States
are under significant pressure to find new ways of meeting their social
duties with increased “efficiency,” or, in other terms, under pressure
to achieve significant savings that allow them to remain in
compliance (or to attain compliance) with financial stability
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obligations without completely dismantling the welfare state.
Although not all of the reforms are driven by efficiency arguments
since there is evidence that quality and choice in public services has
also been a driver.61 Other evidence from Europe indicates that a
central driver of reform of public services is the role of the middle
class as a central and key constituency for welfare reform.62
Public sector reform initiatives, and specifically those concerned
with public service provision, need to be compliant with an
increasingly complicated web of EU economic or market rules and
principles. Despite the increasing relevance of solidarity and the
continued treatment of social services as a matter of exclusive
legislative competence of the Member States, compliance with
secondary EU legislation and with soft law instruments adopted by
the European Commission (indirectly) bring social services within the
sphere of EU economic law. Recent reforms in state aid and public
procurement, emanating from the Monti Report, make it particularly
challenging for Member States to ‘rethink and redesign’ the strategies
for the provision and financing of public and social services.63 The
modernisation of the funding and operation of public services in the
EU had started at the national level in response to national political
preferences for the reduction of state provision and funding of such
services in several Member States,64 but most notably the United
61. K. Dowding & P. John, The Value of Choice in Public Policy, 87 PUB. ADMIN. 219
(2009); JULIAN LE GRAND, THE OTHER INVISIBLE HAND: DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES
THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION (2007).
62. See Joan Costa-Font & Valentina Zigante, The Choice Agenda, in European Health
Systems: The Role of ‘Middle Class Demands’ (London Sch. Econ and Pol. Sci., Paper No.82,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2522841.
63. In particular the Almunia Package up-dating the earlier European Commission
Package on Altmark which regulates the financing and operation of SGEI. Commission
Communication on the application of the European Union State Aid Rules to Compensation
Granted for the Provision of Services of General Economic Interest, 2012 O.J. C 8/4;
Commission Decision of December 20th on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union to State Aid in the Form of Public Service
Compensation Granted to Certain Undertakings Entrusted with the Operation of Services of
General Economic Interest, 2012 O.J. L 7/3; Commission Communication - European Union
Framework for State Aid in the Form of Public Service Compensation, 2012 O.J. C 8/15;
Commission Regulation on the Application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid Granted to Undertakings Providing
Services of General Economic Interest, 2012 O.J., L 114/8; Swap Rate Proxies, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/swap_rates_en.html. See
generally REFORM AND MODERNISATION, supra note 9.
64. See, e.g., A. Anell, Swedish Healthcare Under Pressure, 14 HEALTH ECON.
September 2005, at S237; Yvette Bartholmée & Hans Maarse, Health Insurance Reform in the
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Kingdom.65 But there is also some evidence that efficiency gains and
demands of the European middle classes for greater choice in the
provision of public services, particularly health care, are also
significant drivers in the reform of public services.66 Reform in some
Member States may act as a form of institutional arbitrage creating
incentives for other Member States to follow.67 However, there is also
an acknowledgement that while certain ‘hard’ public services can be
put out to competitive tender and efficiency gains measured, for
example the collection of waste, other ‘social’ services are regarded
as ‘softer’ involving more complicated evaluations of quality.68
Research from the United States shows that markets in social services
are not competitive.69 Indeed, the EU rules on procurement of such
social services allow for a reduction in the competition for social
services contracts.70 Such an approach is controversial: a reduction of
competitive pressure can lead to either a price premium or a drop in
quality for the same price. Having fewer suppliers will also encourage
collusion between them in smaller markets.
This process of opening up public contracts to competition was
Europeanised through the CJEU ruling in Altmark,71 which
established a set of ex ante criteria for the legitimate funding of public
services. This was an indication of a prescriptive approach for the
Member States to adopt in the design and delivery of public services
and was far-reaching given that the EU did not have competence to
legislate in the area. Such services were brought within the remit of
Netherlands, 12 EUROHEALTH 7, (2006); Laura Cabiedes & Ana Guillén, Adopting and
Adapting Managed Competition: Healthcare Reform in Southern Europe, 52 SOC. SCI. MED.
12015 (2001).
65. Social (Welfare) Services are also subject to reform, resulting is less direct provision
of public services by local government and increased ‘marketisation’ of such services. See,
e.g., MUTUALS TASKFORCE, PUBLIC SERVICE MUTUALS: THE NEXT STEPS 6 (2012), available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61776/Public
-Service-Mutuals-next-steps.pdf; HM GOVERNMENT, OPEN PUBLIC SERVICES 9 (2012),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
255288/OpenPublicServices-WhitePaper.pdf.
66. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in READINGS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
(Nicole Woosley Biggart ed., 2008).
67. See Cabiedes & Guillén, supra note 64.
68. See David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatisation in Contracting for Social
Services, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 296 (2003).
69. See Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, Contracting for Government Services: Theory
and Evidence from U.S. Cities, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 507, 535 (2010).
70. See Council Directive 2014/24/EU, supra note 8, art. 74-77.
71. See LE GRAND, supra note 61.
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the market rules by case law and taken up by the Commission in a
quasi-legislative package to manage the administration of the effect of
the market rules on public services. This prescription was further
defined and refined by the Commission in a set of soft law
documents: the Monti-Kroes package. Thus, Altmark can be situated
within the line of case law that state monopolies are no longer
privileged undertakings in the EU operating in a sui generis market.72
Public services can be (and now often are) economic activities that
are delivered in competitive markets and the EU economic (or
market) rules of free movement and completion can be used to foster
efficiency and consumer satisfaction.
A parallel aspect of Altmark was a response to a need to increase
efficiency in the delivery of public services in Europe in response to
increasing international competiveness. Thus through judicial
intervention efficiency and competiveness were introduced as core
values in the delivery of public services in the EU but fine-tuned in a
distinctive European manner to also protect the interests and values
underpinning the role of public services (SGEI) in the EU.
A review of the Altmark ruling was already on the agenda for
2009.73 The Member States had hoped for greater recognition of the
recalibration of the social and the economic balance values in EU law
and policy from Treaty of Lisbon 2007, and, in particular a
recognition that social services could be ring-fenced from interference
from EU law by being provided at the local level or national level and
not fully exposed to market principles. But the impetus from the
Commission’s review of the single market, recognising new ideas of
citizenship and solidarity, and the Monti Report,74 influenced the
Commission to bring SGEI into the main frame of the new single
market programme with tougher conditions on the entrustment of a
public service and tighter fiscal controls to avoid over-compensation
of SGEI. This has focused attention on economic efficiencies of
public services rather than quality. In parallel the Commission has
used soft law processes to indicate to the Member States how and
72. The death knell of State monopolies sounded in the early 1990s, on the eve of the
deadline set of the completion of the internal market. See Höfner v. Macrotron, Case C-41/90,
[1991] E.C.R. I-2010, ¶ 43. Since that case very few cases have been taken using Article
106(1) TFEU as a legal base. But, recently the European Commission and the CJEU showed
that the Article 106 TFEU is not redundant. See Commission v. DEI, Case C-533/12P, [2014]
E.C.R. I___ (delivered July 17, 2014).
73. See Commission Decision No. 2005/842/EC 2005 O.J. L 312/29.
74. See id.
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when social services may continue to be outside the capture of EU
law, and this in turn allows for a prescriptive agenda to emerge: the
Member States are left in little doubt that if they resort to the
marketisation of any public or social services they run the risk of the
EU market rules applying.75
These interventions by the EU reflect the increased interest in
the marketisation of public and social services in Europe, especially
in the United Kingdom. The adoption of ‘competition-based’
solutions or ‘market-oriented’ formulae for the provision of social
services implies the necessity to overcome a set of EU regulatory
hurdles (or controls) at different stages of the process of turning
public services into market-oriented services. Such controls make it
difficult for Member States to seek efficiency gains without resorting
to the (private) market and, consequently, limit their choices and
strategies as soon as there is any type of private participation
(generally, by means of financial transfers, acquisition of ownership
or conclusion of contracts). Unless Member States rearrange their
schemes for the provision of public services without any private
participation whatsoever, EU economic law will apply, generating a
complicated regulatory landscape that may impose significant
restrictions on the Member States’ competence to autonomously
choose how to provide public services under the new market-based
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The elements of solidarity seen in the acceptance of sovereign
debt bailouts funded by the EU, (and the IMF and ECB), for Member
States undergoing complex economic problems reveals the flexibility
in the EU governance framework to adapt to times of crisis and goes
some way to demonstrate that the “EU is working” in its response to
the economic crisis. Austerity is rarely accepted as a popular solution
and in some Member States has led to even greater social and
economic problems. Hall has argued that the public objectives of the
European austerity programmes are not clear:

75. For a general discussion of the persuasive use of soft law, see generally Szyszczak,
Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17. For the most recent form of soft law in relation to
SSGI, see European Commission, Guide to the application of the EU rules on state aid, public
procurement and the internal market services, SWD (2013) 53 Final (Apr. 29, 2013) at 20
(2013).
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It is not the reconstruction of productive capacity, full
employment, or the development of the shared benefit of the
welfare state, but rather the goal of sound fiscal soundness,
formalised in targets for government debt and deficit, and the
ability to borrow and repay, in international financial markets.
. . . austerity is focussed primarily on public spending, rather than
consumer spending (reinforced by the objective of focussing on
the management of public rather than private, debt).76

This distinctive EU response has met with deeper and more
complex criticism and opposition in the way that it has challenged the
constitutional settlement of the Union and altered its values. The use
of legal measures to create a tougher framework for macroeconomic
surveillance of public finances in the EU has resulted in a new
constitutional and institutional arrangement whereby the executive of
the larger, and financially stronger, Member States wield a bigger
voice and power over weaker and less financially secure States.
Within this new framework democratic participation and consultation,
alongside judicial review, transparency and accountability have been
sacrificed, allowing the voice—and the values—of the stronger
Member States to play a significant role in creating a new national
policy framework for the economically, and weaker states.
While it is argued that these States have lost control over their
social contract it is not necessarily the case that the social contract has
been dismantled. However, the de-politicalisation of these processes
and measures has masked the lack of a democratic involvement in the
modernisation and reform of the welfare states of Europe. Inherent
within that policy reform process is the inevitable reduction of
publicly provided or publicly financed services. While this may
eventually lead to the weakening of the traditional welfare state in
some European states this Essay has shown, that this aspect of reform
and modernisation of the role of State intervention in the market is not
wholly generated by the responses to the economic crisis. Such
policies have been on-going and are also generated by other processes
that are also not inherently democratic. The most extreme aspect of
the non-democratic recalibration of national public welfare services is
the ability to litigate to challenge and test national public welfare
services against the free market or economic rules of the EU. The
76. David Hall, Services of General Interest under Regimes of Fiscal Austerity, in
SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST BEYOND THE SINGLE MARKET: EXTERNAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIMENSIONS (M. Krajewski ed., forthcoming 2015).
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ensuing case law alters not only the constitutional balance between
the EU-Member State legislative competence settlement but also
accelerates the ensuing EU competence creep. Applying the EU
economic rules to public services through soft law and soft
governance processes alters the inter-institutional constitutional
balance within the EU. To date this has not led to the breakup of the
EU, or the dismantling of the welfare state in Europe, but a
recalibration of the way in which the social contract in Europe is
made.

